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The EU commission, citing deficiencies in the financial statements of banks during the 
financial crisis, has questioned the independence of the auditors of European banks at the 
onset of the crisis. We test for evidence of impaired auditor independence by examining 
if the economic bond between auditors and clients is associated with the audit quality of 
banks, controlling for the strength of banking regulation of the country in which a bank 
operates. We find no evidence of income-increasing loan loss provisions being positively 
associated with the auditor-client economic bond. There is no indication that auditor 
independence is impaired in EU banks. Stronger country regulation is associated with 
more conservative provisioning before and after the formation of the European Banking 
Authority. We also find that the strength of banking regulation mitigates any tendency of 
auditors’ independence to be compromised by the auditor-client economic bond. 
 
Keywords: Loan loss provisions, Auditor independence, European banks, Banking 
regulation. 







Perceived threats to the independence of statutory auditors motivated the European Union 
(EU) to reform its regulation regarding the provision of statutory audits in member states 
(European Commission, 2016). The reforms were prompted by the global financial crisis 
when doubts pertaining to ‘the credibility and reliability of the audited financial 
statements of banks, other financial institutions and listed companies’ emerged (European 
Commission, 2016, p. 1). Memo 16/2244 of the Commission states that ‘threats to the 
independence of statutory auditors’ challenge their ability ‘to exert thorough professional 
scepticism’ (European Commission, 2016, p. 1). This paper tests for evidence of impaired 
auditor independence by examining if the economic bond between auditors and clients is 
associated with the audit (earnings) quality of large European banks (proxied by abnormal 
loan loss provisions), paying particular attention to the period of the financial crisis and 
taking into account the strength of banking regulation of the country in which a bank 
operates. 
While EU’s reforms pertain to all Public-Interest Entities (PIE), they are firmly rooted 
in the performance of banks over the period 2007-2009. The explanatory memorandum 
of the Proposal 2011/0359 “Regulation of the European parliament and of the council on 
specific requirements regarding statutory audit of public-interest entities” states that, 
given the losses of banks, ‘it is difficult for many citizens and investors to understand 
how auditors could give clean audit reports to their clients (in particular banks) for those 
periods’ (European Commission, 2011, p. 2). Notwithstanding the views of the EU 
Commission, Deumes, Knechel, Meuwissen, Schelleman, and Vanstraelen (2010) point 
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out that regulatory reforms implemented following a crisis are often motivated by 
political expediency and the need to take action. 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 was a very deep crisis. Haldane (2009, p. 2) states 
that ‘some have suggested that it is the worst since the early 1970s; others, the worse 
since the Great Depression; others still, the worst in human history’. There is no doubt 
that it put many European banks under severe pressure (Detragiache, Tressel, & Turk-
Ariss, 2018). The latter authors show that the average return on equity of EU banks fell 
from 16.3% immediately prior to the crisis to 2.2% during the crisis.  In the regions of the 
EU hit hardest by the crisis, profitability fell to an even greater extent.1 The general 
earnings management literature argues that companies are motivated to manage earnings 
when their stock price is under stress or their earnings are under pressure (Burghstahler 
& Dichev, 1997; Young, 2008). Thus, at the onset of the financial crisis, auditors would 
have needed to be especially vigilant with respect to opportunistic upward management 
of earnings. 
The question of whether the quality of the financial reports of large EU banks was 
compromised by a deficiency in auditor independence during the financial crisis is an 
important one. This is especially true in the light of the findings of Kanagaretnam, 
Krishnan, and Lobo (2010) that auditor independence is not compromised for large 
closely-regulated US banks but is for smaller banks. Our EU-base study also offers us the 
opportunity to study how cross-country differences in the strength of banking regulation 
impacts on auditor independence. The financial crisis motivated changes in EU regulation 
pertaining to banks. Prior to 2007 the strength of banking regulation varied substantially 
between countries in the EU. It is this variation that affords us the opportunity to study 
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the impact of different standards of banking regulation on auditor independence. After 
the financial crisis, regulation became much more uniform across the EU.2 Thus, in 
addition, we have the opportunity to investigate the consequences of any changes in 
banking regulation occasioned by the financial crisis on the audit quality of EU banks. 
The literature on the independence of auditors and its relation with the quality of the 
audit is extensive but it is largely US-based. Basioudis, Papakonstantinou, and Geiger 
(2008) assert that it is not correct to extrapolate the findings in one country even to 
countries that appear to be similar. Given that the US is subject to stricter enforcement 
and is a more litigious environment (Coffee, 2007; Li, Beekes, & Peasnell, 2009), the 
results of audit research there cannot simply be applied to the EU. Ferguson, Seow, and 
Young (2004), using UK data, suggest that auditor independence of mind is impaired by 
the provision of non-audit services (NAS) while the overwhelming result of the extensive 
US literature is that auditor independence of mind or fact is not impaired by the provision 
of NAS (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). The regulations governing auditing were changed after 
the accounting scandals (e.g., Enron, Parmalat etc.) at the turn of the century and there is 
little EU-based evidence since the post Enron regulations came into force. A notable 
exception is Campa and Donnelly (2016). However, that paper deals with large non-
financial UK companies while the current paper aims to address the specific issue of the 
audit quality among EU banks which triggered the most recent revision in EU regulation. 
We analyse a panel of data over the nine-year period 2006-2014 on large publicly 
quoted European banks using only accounts prepared under IFRS to aid comparability. 
Furthermore, we split the period covered by the sample into two sub-periods, 2006-2010 
which includes the financial crisis and 2011-2014 which is a period during which banking 
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regulation in the EU became more uniform across countries following the foundation of 
the European Banking Authority (EBA) in late 2010. In the first sub-period we can test if 
the strength of banking regulation in a bank’s country of origin impacts on auditor 
independence and by comparing both sub-periods we can also observe if the foundation 
of the EBA has any impact on the relation between auditor independence and banking 
regulation. We estimate abnormal loan loss provisions (ALLP) and unexpected fees paid 
to the auditors as well as the NAS fee ratio, as our primary measures of earnings quality 
and the economic bond with the auditor, respectively. Higher levels of earnings quality 
are taken to be indicative of higher audit quality. We pay particular attention to negative, 
or income-increasing, ALLP and their association with unexpected total fees, unexpected 
NAS fees and the NAS fee ratio. This is motivated by knowing, with the benefit of 
hindsight, that the loan loss provisions (LLP) of banks are considered to have been 
understated at the onset of the financial crisis. If unexpected NAS fees are positively 
related to the absolute value of negative ALLP we infer that auditor independence is 
compromised by the economic bond created by the fees. 
Our results show that a deficiency in auditor independence does not underlie any 
under-provisioning by publicly quoted banks in the EU. We also report evidence of the 
influence of regulation in the banking industry mitigating any tendency of auditors’ 
independence to be compromised by the economic bond created by fees paid by their 
clients. This finding is consistent with that of Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) for the US. 
There is also some evidence of spillover effects from the provision of NAS. They are 
evidenced by a negative relation between abnormal loan loss provisions, particularly 
income-increasing ALLP, and unexpected NAS fees, for banks operating in countries 
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where banking regulation is strong and only in the period prior to the formation of the 
EBA, i.e., when country specific regulation is more important.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 frames the study in 
terms of the extant literature. Section 3 develops the main hypotheses, details the sample 
selection procedure, and describes the methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
results. Finally, section 5 concludes by highlighting the study’s main implications. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Audit quality is a fundamental but not directly observable input into financial reporting 
quality (Deumes et al., 2010). The latter demands that the financial reports of a company 
faithfully represent the company’s underlying economics (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). The 
supply of audit quality is determined by the auditor’s competence and independence 
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1981). Regulators are worried about the impact of NAS fees on 
auditor independence (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2000; Krishnan, 
Sami, & Zhang, 2005; EU Commission, 2011; 2016) and, thus, academic research has 
developed fee metrics to capture the economic bond between auditors and their clients. 
The SEC seems concerned with the level of NAS fees relative to total fees, i.e., the 
NAS fee ratio (SEC, 2000; Krishnan et al., 2005). However, Francis and Ke (2006) and 
Francis (2006) point out that the NAS fee ratio is affected by both NAS fees and total fees 
so it is not possible to be categorical about which of these is driving the ratio. Kinney and 
Libby (2002) argue that both the NAS fees and the audit fees are capable of creating an 
economic bond, with auditors primarily interested in their overall fees, being willing to 
trade-off either lower audit or NAS fees for an increase in total fees. They advocate that 
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the estimation of NAS fees and total fees different from the level that one would expect 
on the basis of the characteristics of their clients (defined as unexpected NAS fees and 
unexpected total fees) better captures the economic bond. Thus, Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2010), in their study of US banks, use unexpected total fees and unexpected non-audit 
fees as their primary measure of the economic bond which may compromise auditor 
independence. They place particular emphasis on the association of the unexpected total 
and NAS fees with income-increasing (i.e., negative) ALLP. The focus on NAS derives 
from the fact that such services have been perceived to underlie the loss of auditor 
independence that, in some extreme cases, has been instrumental in accounting scandals. 
In fact, despite differences between the US and Europe, the actions taken by regulators in 
both areas after the scandals have aimed to limit the NAS that audit firms can provide to 
their clients (Aschauer & Quick, 2018). 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 prompted additional scrutiny of the audit market in 
Europe. Despite the fact that new regulations included in the 8th EU Directive had not 
been fully implemented at the time of the financial crisis and that no empirical evidence 
pertaining to the effectiveness of these regulations was available, the EU Commission set 
about a major reform of the audit market as a response to the crisis (Deumes et al., 2010). 
The latter authors question whether the new regulations proposed by the commission were 
necessary. Nonetheless, the EU Regulation 537/2014 of the 16th April 2014 (European 
Commission, 2014) introduced significant changes to the audit market with the stated 
objective to ‘improve audit quality and restore investor confidence in financial 
information’ (European Commission, 2016, p. 1). 
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The general finding from the US literature is that auditor independence is not 
compromised by fee income. Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Maydew (2003) report that there is 
no relation between income-increasing discretionary accruals and the total audit fee or 
the fee ratio once the former are adjusted for firm performance. There is also no relation 
between the fee ratio or total fees and the likelihood of firms meeting or beating analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. There is no positive relation between fees or the fee ratio and the 
likelihood of reporting small positive earnings. Finally, the market does not react to the 
magnitude of the fee ratio. In line with these findings, DeFond and Zhang (2014), based 
on a review of the archival auditing literature, point out that NAS fees are not associated 
with restatements, higher discretionary accruals, earnings management, earnings 
benchmarks, or conservatism. This US literature contrasts with evidence from the UK 
which does show signs of impairment of auditor independence in the presence of 
abnormal level of NAS fees (Ferguson et al., 2004; Campa & Donnelly, 2016). However, 
it is crucial to highlight that none of the above studies tests for auditor independence in 
the banking industry but, rather, they specifically exclude financial firms from their 
samples on the basis that their accounts are substantially different to those of other firms. 
It is widely acknowledged that banks form a crucial sector of any economy (Fields, 
Fraser, & Wilkins, 2004) but, despite that, Köhler, Quick, and Willekens (2016) note that 
very little is known about the quality of auditing in the financial sector and the effect of 
audit regulation thereon. Further, it is noteworthy that banks are regulated and this can 
moderate the influence of fee income on auditor independence (Kanagaretnam et al., 
2010). Both Fields et al. (2004) and Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) are US studies, thus the 
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impact of auditor independence on the auditing and, hence, financial reporting quality of 
banks in the EU is relatively unexplored. 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) specifically address the influence of NAS fees on auditor 
independence in US banks. They report that for large banks which are subject to the 
additional regulatory scrutiny of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act (FDICIA), fees paid to the auditor are unrelated to earnings management using ALLP. 
However, they also report that there is a negative relation between ALLP and fees paid 
to auditors for smaller banks: income-increasing earnings management through lower 
ALLP is increasing in the level of fees and unexpected fees. Thus, while auditor 
independence is compromised by total fees and NAS fees, this attenuation of auditor 
independence is moderated by the level of regulatory oversight of the banks which differs 
in relation to their size. Regulatory oversight in the US and the EU is very different. For 
example, the US spends multiples of the amount spent by EU countries on public 
enforcement. When private enforcement is also considered the amount spent on 
enforcement in the US becomes rather an outlier in world terms (Coffee, 2007). It also 
must be recognised that the US is essentially one large country whereas the EU is a union 
of independent states. The EU country that is most similar to the US is the UK. However, 
Li et al. (2009) point out that the US is a far more litigious environment than the UK. 
Thus, it is not possible to extrapolate US results even to that part of the EU which most 
resembles it (Basioudis et al., 2008). Accordingly, the relationship between the economic 
bond of auditors with their clients and audit quality requires to be estimated for EU banks, 
particularly in light of the impetus that concerns regarding the independence of auditors 




3.  Hypothesis Development and Methodology 
3.1 Hypothesis Development  
Loan loss provisions are that part of accrual-accounting that are reported in the income 
statement of banks as expenses and increase the loan loss allowance in the balance sheet 
(Andreou, Cooper, Louca, & Philip, 2017). In hindsight it is clear that the provisions of 
EU banks were not satisfactory at the time of the financial crisis. What remains unclear 
is why such provisions were inadequate. The current research focuses on the EU 
commission’s justification for the major overhaul of regulation of the audit market: a 
presumed deficit in the necessary independence of auditors from their client banks. 
Accordingly, we examine if the amount of fees paid to auditors (the economic bond) is a 
good explanation for under-provisioning in European banks. Our focus is to examine if 
the level of impairment of loans, i.e., loan loss provisions, and hence bank income, is 
affected by the extent of fee income paid to auditors, in particular unexpected total fees, 
unexpected NAS fees, and the NAS fee ratio. This is motivated by the strong emphasis 
on the independence of the auditor under the new EU regulatory regime which includes 
the prohibition of certain NAS by the auditor to the PIEs that they audit and imposing 
limitations and thresholds on the fees charged for NAS. We state our first hypothesis, in 
alternative form, as follows: 
Hypothesis 1. The economic bond between the auditor and its client is positively related 




Campa and Donnelly (2016) suggest that their and other UK results (e.g., Ferguson et 
al., 2004) differ from those in the US since the latter is a more litigious society. Thus the 
context in which the auditor is working moderates the influence of the economic bond 
created with the client by unexpected fees. Since banking is a regulated industry, the 
context is different to that of the general population of firms. The accounts of banks are 
also subject to the scrutiny of their regulators. This will ensure that strictly regulated 
banks will be unlikely to manage earnings egregiously and the auditors will be unlikely 
to allow earnings management behaviours (Kanagaretnam et al., 2010). On the basis of 
these arguments we state our second hypothesis, in alternative form, as follows: 
Hypothesis 2. The strength of banking regulation moderates the relation between the 
economic bond of the auditor with its client and the level of abnormal loan loss provisions 
of banks. 
 
3.2 Sample selection 
Our hypotheses are tested on a sample of large financial institutions listed on the major 
European Union financial markets. We use data from annual reports prepared under IFRS 
for a nine-year period starting in 2006.3 The exclusive use of observations from annual 
reports prepared under IFRS prevents the confounding of results by the use of accounting 
data prepared under different accounting standards. All data used in the analyses have 
been collected from Datastream®. We use Worldscope lists for fourteen countries in the 
EU and isolate banks on these lists. The lists are free from survivorship bias as they 
include companies that are no longer quoted on the markets. This yields an initial sample 
of 374 banks. We then exclude banks for which DataStream does not have data for non-
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performing loans: this reduced the sample size to 177 banks. Our tests pertaining to 
auditor independence require data on audit fees, total fees, and fees paid to the auditor for 
NAS. Obtaining the requisite fee data proved impossible for most of the banks in our 
sample. After imposing all the necessary requirements to obtain the disaggregation of the 
value of total fees between audit and NAS fees and deleting all firm-year observations 
which do not have the required data to estimate unexpected fees, our final sample contains 
60 unique financial institutions4 and a total of 353 firm-year observations.5 The market 
capitalisation of the banks in the sample constitutes over 79% of the total market 
capitalization of the population of banks listed in the countries included in our analysis, 
thus the sample is representative of the population of large quoted EU banks.  
 
3.3 Loan loss provisions and the economic bond between auditors and clients 
In order to test our first hypothesis, we need to estimate the level of ALLP of banks as 
well as the economic bond between auditors and clients. We outline how we estimate 
these variables below. We then explain how we measure the relative strength of banking 
regulation across countries. We require this measure in order to test our second hypothesis 
as well as a general control for differences in the strength of regulatory frameworks across 
countries. 
 
3.3.1 Estimation of abnormal loan loss provisions 
A certain level of loan loss provisions must be included in the annual reports of banks to 
meet the matching principle of expense recognition. Thus, in accordance with previous 
studies on this topic (e.g., Kanagaretnam et al., 2010), we will not use the raw amount of 
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loan loss provisions but, rather, the abnormal level of loan loss provisions (ALLP). As in 
Kanageretnam et al. (2010), we pay particular attention to negative ALLP since these are 
used to increase income. In addition, it is clearly the under provisioning by banks that 
motivated the changes in the regulation of the European statutory audit market. 
Since we are using data from several countries, we extend the model used by 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) to explain LLP. In particular, we augment their model by 
including a country-specific variable, growth of GDP per capita, as well as the net income 
before LLP and extraordinary items (EBP) (Laeven & Majnoni, 2003). The 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) model estimates the normal component of LLP by regressing 
the latter on beginning loan loss allowance, beginning non-performing loans, change in 
non-performing loans, net loan charge-offs, change in total loans outstanding, net income 
before extraordinary items and LLP as well as total loans outstanding. These variables 
have been used in several prior studies to estimate the normal component of LLP (e.g., 
Wahlen, 1994; Laeven & Majnoni, 2003; Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Mathieu, 2003). Our 
model also includes year fixed effects. It is described by equation (1) below. To remove 
potential bias due to the presence of outliers, when estimating this equation, continuous 
variables are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentile. 
 
LLPit = α + β1BEGLLAit + β2BEGNPLit+ β3CHNPLit +β4LCOit + β5CHLOANit 




Variables are defined in Appendix A. The residuals are the abnormal component of 
LLP, referred to as ALLP. These ALLP are the measure of accounting (audit) quality 
used in the paper. 
 
3.3.2 Estimation of the economic bond between auditors and clients 
Studies that focus on auditor independence measure the auditor-client economic bond 
using two main proxies: the level of unexpected fees and the NAS fee ratio. In relation to 
the former, Kinney and Libby (2002) state that it is the unexpected level of the total fees 
and the NAS fees that reflects the ‘abnormal’ profitability of a client. For completeness, 
however, we also estimate the unexpected level of audit fees while acknowledging that 
this variable is often used in audit research as an indication of the thoroughness of the 
audit.  
We estimate the level of unexpected fees as the residuals of a model where auditor 
fees are regressed on a set of firm characteristics as indicated in model (2) below. The 
model is derived from Fields et al. (2004), Kanagaretnam et al. (2010), and Campa and 
Donnelly (2016) and reflects the fact that, in accordance with previous research, auditor 
fees are related to audit complexity (MTB, GROWTH), audit risk (LOSS, RESTAT, ROA, 
CGSCORE) (Firth, 1997; Ashbaugh et al., 2003), client size (SIZE), bank’s credit risk 
(SNPL, SLCO), operating risk (EFFICIENCY), liquidity risk (SECURITIES), and capital 
risk (INTANG, CAPRATIO). It also includes country and year fixed effects. This model, 
as well as all the other models in the paper, do not control for Big 4 audit firms because 
all firms in the sample are audited by a Big 4 firm. Because audit and NAS fees may be 
determined simultaneously, we estimated model (2) with total fees, audit fees and NAS 
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fees as dependent variables using simultaneous equations.6 All continuous variables in 
equation (2) are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
FEEit = α + β1SIZEit + β2SNPLit+ β3LOSSit +β4INTANGit + β5EFFICIENCYit + 
β6SLCOit + β7CAPRATIOit +β8CGSCOREit +β9RESTATit + β10GROWTHit + 
β11SECURITIESit + β12MTBit +β13ROAit + εit  (2) 
 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. The residuals of equation (2) are the unexpected 
level of the different fees paid to auditors.  
The second measure of the auditor-client economic bond is the NAS fee ratio 
(NASFEERATIO) calculated as total NAS fees divided by total fees (e.g., Koh, Rajgopal, 
& Srinivasan, 2013). 
 
3.3.3 Estimation of the relative strength of a country’s banking regulation 
To investigate the association between the auditor-client bond and the audit quality of 
banks, taking account of the strength of banking regulation of the country in which a bank 
operates, we estimate a variable, REG, that represents the latter feature. REG is an 
indicator variable derived from an index, OFFICIAL, which is increasing in the influence 
of the banking supervisory agency and devised by Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007). It 
is coded 1 for strong regulation countries (i.e., countries with an index above the median 
of the sample) and 0 for countries with weaker bank supervision, in accordance with 




3.4 Loan loss provisions and economic bond between auditors and clients: the model 
To test our hypotheses, we develop a model where the dependent variable is the level of 
ALLP while measures of unexpected fees paid to the auditor and the NAS fee ratio are 
included, in turn, as independent variables. We also use our proxy for the strength of 
banking regulation of the country in which a bank operates, REG. We interact REG with 
the unexpected fees or economic bond (AUDCLIBOND) to investigate if and how it 
moderates the relationship between ALLP and the economic bond between auditors and 
their clients. In accordance with Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) and Campa and Donnelly 
(2016), our model also controls for additional factors that previous research has 
documented to be associated with earnings management measures, such as firm size, 
market-to-book ratio, firm growth and performance, corporate governance quality as well 
as other control variables that take into account the reversal of accruals over time (past 
LLP) and capital management incentives (tier 1 capital ratio and total capital ratio). The 
model also includes year and country dummy variables. It is represented by equation (3).  
All continuous variables in this equation, with the exception of ALLP and AUDCLIBOND 
based on unexpected fees, are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
ALLPit = α + β1AUDCLIBONDit + β2CAPRATIOit+ β3CGSCOREit +β4GROWTHit +  
β5MTBit+ β6EBPit + β7LOSS +β8 LMVEit +β9TIER1it + β10PASTLLP+ β11REGit  
   +β12AUDCLIBOND*REGit + εit   (3) 
 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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We estimate the model separately for negative (i.e., income-increasing) ALLP 
(NEGALLP) and positive (i.e., income-decreasing) ALLP (POSALLP), in accordance 
with Kanagaretnam et al. (2010). Negative (i.e., income-increasing) ALLP are 
transformed into their absolute value to make the interpretation of the regression 
coefficients easier. 
The relevant coefficients for testing our first hypothesis, in model (3), are β1 as well 
as the sum of β1 and β12 which represent the relation between ALLP and the auditor-client 
economic bond for banks operating, respectively, in countries with weak and strong bank 
regulation. In particular, for negative (i.e., income-increasing) ALLP, positive coefficients 
on unexpected total fees, unexpected NAS fees, and the NAS fee ratio indicate that a 
tighter auditor-client bond is associated with greater income-increasing ALLP (i.e., since 
ALLP are in absolute value terms). For positive (i.e., income-decreasing) ALLP, positive 
coefficients would suggest that a tighter auditor-client bond is related to more 
conservative provisioning (Kanagaretnam et al., 2010) and negative coefficients would 
suggest that a closer bond is related to less income-reducing provisions. 
If our second hypothesis is supported we would expect a negative and significant β12 
when negative ALLP is the dependent variable. This would indicate that the strength of 
bank regulation attenuates any positive relation between the absolute value of negative 
ALLP (income-increasing) and the economic bond between auditors and clients. When 
positive ALLP is the dependent variable a positive value for β12 would suggest that 
strengthening the bond between auditor and client is associated with more conservative 
provisioning in tightly regulated countries. 
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All models presented above are estimated using OLS. Significance levels are 
calculated using t-statistics from robust standard errors clustered by unique bank. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Estimation of abnormal loan loss provision and unexpected fees 
Our first task is to determine the normal level of ALLP. Table 1 outlines the results of 
estimating equation (1). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
We find that the model works well and explains over 80% of the variation in LLP. 
The coefficients are generally of the predicted sign. Loan loss provisions are decreasing 
in the profitability of the banks and are increasing in CHNPL, CHLOAN and LOANS as 
might be predicted. The coefficient on BEGLLA is also positive which is indicative of 
persistence in provisioning and hence under-provisioning in prior years. This is consistent 
with Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011). The negative coefficient on EBP contrasts 
with the results of Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and suggests that European banks were 
not income smoothing over the period studied. This avoidance of income smoothing 
behavior is an outcome desired by the IASB when IAS 39 was designed. The residuals of 
the model are our measure of ALLP. 
 
Table 2 outlines the estimation of equation (2) which is used to estimate unexpected 
fees.   
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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We find that size, intangibles, efficiency, and ROA are significantly positively related 
to both total fees and audit fees. We observe that size and intangibles are also significantly 
positively related to NAS fees. These relationships are consistent with prior research. For 
example, the coefficient on INTANG is positive and consistent with Fields et al. (2004) 
since more intangibles suggest more complex, acquisitive, and risk taking banks. We also 
find a negative relationship between audit fees and the presence of restatements, evidence 
that higher audit fees are related to better quality audits. While our model explains most 
of the cross-sectional variation in total and audit fees, it only explains about one third of 
the variation in NAS fees. The residuals of the models are our measure of unexpected fee 
levels. 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
The descriptive statistics are outlined in Table 3.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
This table reveals that 54% of the ALLP over the period are negative (income-
increasing). On average, NAS fees account for about 22% of total fees paid to the auditors 
but it is clear that they are much higher for some banks. 
 
The correlation matrix is reported in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
This table shows insignificant correlations between ALLP and our measures of 
auditor-client bond. EBP is significantly negatively related to both negative (absolute 
values) and positive ALLP. This suggests that some firms with low earnings before 
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provisions tend to have extreme levels of positive ALLP while others have extremely 
negative ALLP. However, firms with high EBP have low levels of abnormal provisions 
in absolute terms. This is suggestive of banks with low levels of EBP managing earnings 
more than those with high levels. It is a similar story for the loss dummy which has a 
positive relation with both negative and positive ALLP. This is consistent with the 
earnings management literature pertaining to discontinuities around benchmarks with not 
all firms electing to manage earnings in the same direction when close to a benchmark 
(Gore, Pope, & Singh, 2007). Past LLP are positively related to ALLP, regardless of 
whether the latter are positive or negative suggesting some persistence in provisioning. 
Larger banks have less positive and less negative ALLP. Unexpected audit fees and 
unexpected total fees are very strongly related. Similarly, the NAS fee ratio is strongly 
positively correlated with unexpected NAS fees while it is negatively but not as strongly 
correlated with unexpected audit fees. These findings confirm that, while the NAS fee 
ratio is mainly driven by NAS fees, it is also influenced by the level of audit fee. It is also 
noteworthy that EBP is strongly negatively correlated with past LLP indicating that there 
is some anticipation of problems with loan portfolios. CAPRATIO and TIER1 are very 
closely related as would be expected. LOSS and EBP are also highly correlated. We 
perform a diagnostic test for multicollinearity by estimating the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) coefficients for our regression models, which is always significantly below the 
threshold of 10 (Kennedy, 2008), suggesting that multicollinearity does not affect our 
analyses.7 
 
4.3 Multivariate analysis 
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4.3.1 Auditor-client economic bond and level of loan loss provisions of banks 
Table 5 outlines the results of the main tests of our hypotheses 1 and 2 which are designed 
to establish if the economic bond (unexpected fees and the NAS fee ratio) between 
auditors and clients is related to the accounting quality of banks (abnormal loan loss 
provisions) and if the standard of banking regulation in a country moderates this relation. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Panel A focuses on negative (i.e., income-increasing) ALLP. None of the coefficients 
on unexpected fees or the NAS fee ratio (β1) is significantly positive. We infer that, even 
in weakly regulated countries, auditor independence is not impaired sufficiently by the 
economic bond to tolerate abnormally low loan loss provisions. The sum of β1 and β12 is 
negative and significant when we measure the auditor-client economic bond by the level 
of unexpected total and NAS fees. This is the opposite of what we would expect in the 
event of impairment of auditor independence. The interaction term is significantly 
negative for unexpected total fees and unexpected NAS fees and, especially the latter 
relation, is particularly strong leading one to conclude that it is mainly spillover effects 
from NAS in strongly regulated countries that underlie the negative sum of β1 and β12 in 
both scenarios. Thus, our results indicate that the strength of banking regulation of 
countries significantly limits the impairment of auditor independence in the presence of 
high levels of total and NAS fees. Indeed, provided auditor independence is bolstered by 
strong banking regulation, we observe a spillover associated with NAS. It is clear that, if 
there were any tendency on the part of auditor independence to be compromised by the 
economic bond created by unexpected NAS fees, it would be swamped by the influence 
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of stronger regulation that helps ensure that auditor independence is not compromised. 
REG itself is not significantly related to negative ALLP. 
Banks with relatively high growth and market-to-book ratios have high levels of 
negative ALLP. This is consistent with the general finding in the earnings management 
literature that growth stocks generally manage earnings upward more than value stocks. 
The underlying reason for this is that the price of growth stocks, being more dependent 
on future expectations of earnings than value stocks, are punished more severely when 
they announce disappointing earnings (Skinner & Sloan, 2002; Donnelly, 2014). The 
indicator variable LOSS is positively related to income-increasing ALLP in column A and 
C. This suggests that banks use their income increasing ALLP to reduce or even eliminate 
losses before provisions. 
Table 5 Panel B reports the estimation of model (3) for positive (i.e., income-
decreasing) ALLP. All of the fee variables and the NAS fee ratio are insignificant here 
for banks in weakly regulated countries (i.e., the coefficient β1 is insignificant in all 
columns). The sum of β1 and β12 is negative and significant when we measure the auditor-
client economic bond using the level of NAS fees. Accordingly, UNEXPNASFEE*REG 
is also negative and significant which suggests that there is a more negative relation 
between unexpected NAS fees and income-decreasing ALLP in strongly regulated 
countries relative to weakly regulated countries, i.e., there is greater tendency for 
spillovers in strongly regulated countries which limits also the recognition of abnormal 
income-decreasing ALLP. REG itself is significantly positive suggesting that there are 
greater abnormal income-decreasing provisions where banking regulation is strong: 
provisions are more conservative. 
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EBP is negatively related to income-decreasing ALLP but LOSS is never significant 
here. It would appear that banks with high EBP have less income-decreasing provisions 
which is not indicative of using provisions for income smoothing. This is in accordance 
with the aims of IAS 39. GROWTH is significantly positive for income-decreasing ALLP 
just as it is for income-decreasing ALLP. The fact that these stocks suffer particularly 
when their earnings disappoint may motivate the income-increasing ALLP while a desire 
to shift income into years where it is needed may underlie the relation between GROWTH 
and income-reducing ALLP. LMVE is positively related to income-reducing ALLP so 
larger banks take steps to reduce income. This is consistent with a political cost 
explanation with the largest banks in Europe not wishing to appear to be too profitable. 
It is clear from the results discussed above that fees, particularly unexpected total fees 
and unexpected NAS fees, and the NAS fee ratio are not associated with provisioning in 
a manner that would suggest any compromise of auditor independence for large European 
banks. This contrasts with the rationale of the EU Commission for tightening regulation 
of the audit market and the results of Campa and Donnelly (2016) who report that auditor 
independence is compromised by higher NAS fees for firms outside the financial services 
sector. The significant results pertaining to fees point to unexpected NAS fees providing 
spillover effects in strongly regulated countries relative to weakly regulated countries. 
 
4.3.3 Auditor-client economic bond and level of loan loss provisions of banks: the impact 
of the financial crisis 
We now evaluate whether the financial crisis impacts on the above results and if the 
relationships documented above are maintained across the period of the crisis. We split 
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our sample into two periods and we estimate our model (3) for each of them. The first 
period runs from 2006-2010, thus including the financial crisis, while the second period 
covers 2011-2014 which is the period immediately after the formation of the EBA in late 
2010. We focus specifically on negative ALLP, since they increase income and cause an 
overestimation of the performance of banks. Results are presented in Table 6. Panel A of 
Table 6 reports the results for NEGALLP up to 2010 and Panel B contains the results for 
NEGALLP for the later period.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The results for the period up to and including the financial crisis reveal no positive 
relation between all of our abnormal fee variables and NEGALLP. This finding is 
unaffected by the strength of banking regulation in individual countries. It is precisely the 
same story after the formation of the EBA (Panel B).  
REG is significantly negative in the period that includes the financial crisis (Panel A) 
but it is insignificant after the formation of the EBA (Panel B). Thus, banks in strongly 
regulated countries have less abnormal income-increasing provisions in the period that 
includes the crisis. The significant control variables are consistent with the results 
outlined in Table 5. 
We repeat the analysis for positive, i.e., income-decreasing, ALLP. The results (not 
tabulated) reveal that REG is not significant in explaining positive ALLP in the period 
including the crisis.8 However, the interaction terms REG*UNEXPTOTFEE and 
REG*UNEXPNASFEE are both significantly negative indicating that spillover effects are 
maintained in strongly regulated countries as outlined in Table 5.  For the period after the 
formation of the EBA, REG is always significantly positive but none of the unexpected 
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fee variables as well as the NAS fee ratio are significant. The salient result for regulation 
is that it is related to more conservative provisioning: in the period that includes the 
financial crisis REG is negatively related to income-increasing provisions while in the 
period post-EBA formation is it positively related to income-decreasing provisions. 
 
4.3.4 Tests of Robustness 
We run a series of tests of robustness. We modify our measure of unexpected fees and 
create indicator variables to reflect fees that are above the third quartile level of fees. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The evidence from the above tests is consistent with that reported in Tables 5. Indeed, 
in panel A of Table 7 that focuses on income-increasing ALLP, we still find no evidence 
of auditor independence being impaired by the amount of fees above the third quartile 
and we observe spillover effects in the presence of high NAS fees but only among banks 
operating in countries with strong banking regulation. Panel B of Table 7 focuses on 
income-decreasing ALLP. We do not find any relationship between ALLP and auditor-
client economic bond and the coefficient on the variable REG indicates that financial 
institutions operating in countries with a strong banking regulation are, overall, more 
conservative.  
Additional robustness tests (not tabulated) are carried out as follows. We use the 
indicator variable explained above and re-estimate our model before and after the period 
of the financial crisis. Results are consistent with those reported in Table 6. We repeat all 
of our tests using another indicator variable to reflect fees that are above the median level 
of fees. Results of these tests are consistent with those reported in Table 5 and 6. In 
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relation to the limitations on the provision of NAS to audit clients, EU Regulation 
537/2014 introduced a cap on permissible NAS of 70% of the average of the fees paid in 
the last three consecutive financial years to the statutory audit(s) of the audited entity. 
Thus, we repeat our tests estimating the auditor-client bond with an indicator variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the level of NAS fees is greater than 70% of the audit fees. In line 
with the results discussed on the previous section, we do not find evidence of auditor 
independence being impaired by the level of NAS fees above such a threshold. We repeat 
all of the tests reported in Tables 5 and 6 above using the absolute value of ALLP instead 
of NEGALLP and POSALLP. This allows us to use the maximum amount of data available 
to us. The results of these tests support those reported above. We then modify the 
dependent variable, the absolute value of ALLP, and create an indicator variable to reflect 
above median values and use our indicator variables for fees as the explanatory variables. 
We use a logit model to estimate this equation and find that the results support those 
reported in Tables 5 and 6 above. Moreover, we take into account the bond between 
auditor and client created by the audit tenure and carry out two additional tests of 
robustness. In particular, we re-estimate equation (3) by controlling for early audits using 
an indicator variable which is 1 for the first two audits and 0 otherwise. In addition, we 
replace our measure of unexpected fees with audit tenure. The results from these analyses 
are entirely consistent with those reported above.  
Chen, Hribar, and Melessa (2018) point out that using the residuals from a first step 
regression as the dependent variable in a second step regression, which is the case for our 
ALLP, is likely to result in biased coefficients and standard errors. To address this issue 
we use the technique suggested by Chen et al. (2018, p. 773-774) and employ all the 
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unique independent variables in equations (1) and (3), as explanatory variables for LLP. 
The result from these regressions support those reported above. In particular, none of the 
fee variables are significant in any model used to explain LLP except when 
AUDICLIBOND is based on unexpected total fees. In this case, the coefficient is 
significantly positive at the 10% level. This suggests, however, that increased total fees 
paid to the auditor are associated with additional provisions, the opposite of what would 
be expected if auditor independence were compromised. Finally, additional tests also 
reveal that our results are not affected by M&A activity in the banks. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Using a sample of large publicly quoted European banks we test for evidence of impaired 
auditor independence by examining if the economic bond between an auditor and its client 
is associated with the audit (earnings) quality of banks, controlling for the strength of 
banking regulation of the country in which a bank operates. We use unexpected fees paid 
to the auditor, particularly unexpected total fees and unexpected NAS fees, and the NAS 
fee ratio as measures of the economic bond between auditors and clients. We employ 
ALLP, particularly negative (income-increasing) ALLP, as our primary measure of the 
earnings (audit) quality of banks. We report that there is no evidence of abnormal negative 
loan loss provisions being positively associated with the economic bond between auditors 
and clients. Thus, we find no indication that auditor independence is impaired in EU 
banks. This result is maintained for the period that includes the financial crisis as well as 
the post-crisis period. It would appear that the misgivings pertaining to reform of the EU 
audit market for PIEs expressed in Deumes et al. (2010) are well founded, at least as far 
29 
 
as large banks are concerned. However, it must be admitted that the UK evidence 
pertaining to less regulated non-financial companies provided by Campa and Donnelly 
(2016) would suggest that the EU reforms do have some merit.  
We find that stronger regulation is associated with more income-decreasing ALLP.  
We also report that stronger banking regulation reduces negative (income-increasing) 
ALLP in the period of the crisis. These results are indicative of country-level banking 
regulation being associated with conservative provisioning. Much variation remains 
particularly with respect to disclosure across European banks (see endnote 9 below). With 
respect to auditors, we report that regulation moderates the relation between the auditor-
client bond and income-increasing loan loss provisions as expected. The negative 
coefficient on the interaction of unexpected NAS fees with the strength of banking 
regulation provides some evidence of spillover effects for banks primarily operating in 
countries where banking regulation is traditionally strong. This suggests that banks from 
strongly regulated countries may be motivated to further engage with their auditors to 
improve their financial reporting quality. 
Overall, we conclude that an impairment of auditor independence is not responsible 
for under-providing for loan losses by publicly quoted banks in the EU. We attribute the 
difference between our findings for banks and those of Campa and Donnelly (2016) for 
non-financial firms in the UK to the regulated nature of the banking industry 
counterbalancing the pressure of unexpected total fees and unexpected NAS fees on 
auditor independence. In addition, the results we report when estimating normal and 
abnormal ALLP (see Table 1) provide support for the change from the incurred loss 
method to the expected loss method for the impairment of loans introduced by the new 
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IFRS 9. Further research on this matter is undoubtedly warranted. Our findings also 
encourage greater links between researchers and regulators, especially in relation to the 
auditing of financial institutions as strongly recommended by Barabás (2013).  
There are some caveats pertaining to our results. Our sample comprises large publicly 
quoted banks from fourteen EU countries, ten of which are in the Eurozone. It must also 
be recognised that not all EU economies are market-based. The sample size is not as large 
as we would like due to the non-disclosure of audit fee information by some banks.9 That 
said, the sample contains the largest banks in the EU, the vast majority of which are 
directly regulated by the ECB and the EBA. 
     
ENDNOTES 
1 In the group of six countries made up of Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain average ROE 
fell from 16.3% pre-crisis to 2.2% in the crisis and -2.1% post-crisis. 
2 The European Banking Authority (EBA) was formed in January 2011 with the objective of establishing a 
set of rules that are applicable to all banks in the EU in the same manner. It was established by the EU 
Regulation 1093/2010 of 24 November 2010. It is involved in the supervision of all banks in the EU not 
just those in the Eurozone. 
3 For accounting periods ending after 1st January 2005 all PIEs in the EU prepared their accounts using 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Since some variables in our models require lagged data 
we are obliged to begin the data one year after IFRS adoption to ensure all of our data is prepared under the 
same accounting standards. 
4 The 60 banks in the sample belong to the following countries: Austria (2), Belgium (2), Denmark (3), 
France (4), Germany (2), Greece (4), Ireland (4), Italy (9), Netherland (1), Poland (6), Portugal (3), Spain 
(9), Sweden (4), and the United Kingdom (7). 
While the number of banks in the sample may seem small, its size has been impacted greatly by the 
unavailability of audit fee data. Indeed, if data pertaining to audit fees were not needed in our tests, we 
could have used 177 unique banks which is a far larger sample than that used by comparable studies, such 
as Leventis, Dimitropoulos, and Anandarajan (2011) which analyses 91 unique European banks (including 
Switzerland) and Manganaris, Beccalli, and Dimitropoulos (2017) which analyses 90 (416 bank-years) 
including 12 non-EU banks from the EFTA countries Norway and Switzerland. 
5 The number of total firm-year observations is lower than the number of unique banks multiplied by the 
number of years investigated as several banks did not have data for the entire time series investigated.  
6 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to us. 
7 Although the analysis of the VIF does not reveal any multicollinearity problem, we re-estimated all our 
models omitting the variable CAPRATIO and our results are unaffected. 
8 Not tabulated tests are available from the authors upon request. 
9 It is noteworthy that a European Banking Authority Report on non-performing exposures from 2016 had 
to reduce the size of its sample of banks from 166 to 116 for an analysis by residence of the counterparty 
due to non-disclosure (European Banking Authority, 2016). 
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Appendix A. Variable description (in alphabetical order) 
ALLP = value of abnormal loan loss provision (the residual from model (1)).  
AUDCLIBOND = proxies for the economic bond between auditors and clients (for details see: 
UNEXPTOTFEE, UNEXPNASFEE, UNEXAUDFEE, NASFEERATIO, UNEXPTOTFEE_3Q, 
UNEXPNASFEE_3Q, UNEXAUDFEE_3Q, NASFEERATIO_3Q). 
BEGLLA = beginning loan loss allowance divided by beginning total assets. 
BEGNPL = beginning non-performing loans divided by beginning total assets. 
CAPRATIO = total risk-adjusted capital ratio. 
CGSCORE = measure of companies’ corporate governance quality.1 
CHLOAN = change in total loans outstanding divided by beginning total assets. 
CHNPL = change in non-performing loans divided by beginning total assets. 
EBP = net income before extraordinary items and LLP divided by beginning total assets. 
EFFICIENCY = total operating expenses divided by total revenues (i.e., interest income plus 
other income). 
FEE = fees paid to the auditor: Total Fees = ln (audit fees + non-audit fees); or Non-Audit Fees 
= ln (non-audit fees); or Audit Fees = ln (audit fees).  
GDPGROWTH = real growth rate in domestic product per capita of the country where the 
financial institution is located. 
GROWTH = annual change in total assets. 
INTANG = intangible assets divided by total assets. 
LCO = net loan charge-offs divided by beginning total assets. 
LLP = provision for loan losses divided by beginning total assets. 
LMVE = natural log of market value of common equity at the end of the year. 
LOANS = total loans outstanding divided by beginning total assets. 
LOSS = 1 if a firm reports a net loss and 0 otherwise. 
MTB = market value of equity divided by book value of equity. 
NASFEERATIO = Non-audit fees divided by total fees paid to auditors. 
NASFEERATIO_3Q = 1 for firm-year observations with NASFEERATIO bigger than the third 
quartile of the sample and 0 otherwise.  
NEGALLP = absolute value of negative ALLP. 
PASTLLP = prior year’s LLP divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
POSALLP = absolute value of positive ALLP. 
REG = 1 for strong regulation countries (i.e., countries with an index above the median of the 
sample) and 0 for countries with weaker bank supervision. 
RESTAT = 1 for firm-year observations that are later restated and 0 otherwise. 
ROA = operating profit divided by beginning total assets. 
SECURITIES = [1–(total securities/total assets)].   
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
SLCO = net loan charge-offs divided by loan loss allowance.   
SNPL = non-performing loans divided by lagged total loans. 
TIER1 = tier 1 risk-adjusted capital ratio. 
UNEXAUDFEE = unexpected total fees, estimated as the residuals from model (1) using total 
audit fees as dependent variable. 
UNEXAUDFEE_3Q = 1 for firm-year observations with UNEXAUDFEE bigger than the third 
quartile of the sample and 0 otherwise. 
UNEXPNASFEE = unexpected total fees, estimated as the residuals from model (1) using total 
non-audit fees as dependent variable. 
UNEXPNASFEE_3Q = 1 for firm-year observations with UNEXPNASFEE bigger than the third 
quartile of the sample and 0 otherwise. 
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UNEXPTOTFEE = unexpected total fees, estimated as the residuals from model (1) using total 
fees as dependent variable. 
UNEXPTOTFEE_3Q = 1 for firm-year observations with a UNEXPTOTFEE bigger than the 
third quartile of the sample and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
1 The score is provided by a DataStream ASSET4 ESG ratio coded ‘CGVSCORE’. It is a number between 0 and 100 
that indicates how a company performs compared to the entire ASSET4 universe. This figure includes normalized 
scores thus is not affected by the different levels of governance quality in each country; it is ‘independent’, i.e., it is not 
affected by biases due to a self-selection of corporate governance attributes to be included in the score. 
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Table 1. Results of regression of LLP on determinants of normal LLP 
  




















R-squared  0.810 
F-Stat 167.06*** 
Year dummies Yes 
P-values (in parentheses below the coefficients) are calculated using robust standard errors. *, **, *** 
indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level or better. 
 
Regression model: 
LLPit = α + β1BEGLLAit + β2BEGNPLit+ β3CHNPLit +β4LCOit + β5CHLOANit+ β6EBPit + β7LOANSit 
+β8GDPGROWTHit + εit 
 




Table 2. Results of simultaneous regressions of fee measures on determinants of fees 
 (A) (B) (C) 
Dependent variable Total Fees Non-Audit fees Audit fees 
INTERCEPT -2.769 7.077 -3.272** 
 (0.158) (0.210) (0.028) 
SIZE 0.780*** 0.345* 0.893*** 
 (0.000) (0.086) (0.000) 
SNPL -0.370 1.610 -1.433 
 (0.739) (0.666) (0.178) 
LOSS -0.104 -0.231 -0.125 
 (0.486) (0.646) (0.385) 
INTANG 29.277*** 101.699*** 14.607** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) 
EFFICIENCY 2.827*** 0.008 2.386*** 
 (0.001) (0.998) (0.005) 
SLCO 0.039 -0.903 -0.080 
 (0.868) (0.249) (0.722) 
CAPRATIO 1.520 9.291 -0.712 
 (0.452) (0.171) (0.713) 
CGSCORE 0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.804) (0.919) (0.252) 
RESTAT -0.067 0.223 -0.151* 
 (0.475) (0.480) (0.093) 
GROWTH -0.425 -0.006 -0.409 
 (0.150) (0.995) (0.149) 
SECURITIES 0.001 -0.192 0.176 
 (0.999) (0.877) (0.619) 
MTB -0.051 -0.461 0.077 
 (0.640) (0.208) (0.459) 
ROA 47.452*** -47.280 34.805** 
 (0.007) (0.427) (0.040) 
Observations 353 353 353 
R-squared  0.743 0.334 0.777 
Chi-Squared 193,562.65*** 176.81*** 1,231.81*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 





Table 2 (cont’d). Results of simultaneous regressions of fee measures on determinants of fees 
The model is estimated using simultaneous equations. P-values (in parentheses below the coefficients) 
are calculated using robust standard errors. For clarity, the year-specific and country-specific intercepts 




FEEit = α + β1SIZEit + β2SNPLit+ β3LOSSit +β4INTANGit + β5EFFICIENCYit + β6SLCOit + 
β7CAPRATIOit +β8CGSCOREit +β9RESTATit + β10GROWTHit + β11SECURITIESit + β12MTBit 
+β13ROAit + εit 
 






Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 N. Mean Median Std. Dev. 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile 
ALLP 353 0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.001 
NEGALLP 192 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 
POSALLP 161 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 
UNEXPTOTFEE 353 0.000 0.031 0.695 -0.357 0.335 
UNEXPNASFEE 353 0.000 0.153 2.335 -0.685 2.335 
UNEXAUDFEE 353 0.000 0.001 0.667 -0.323 0.323 
NASFEERATIO 353 0.223 0.178 0.176 0.083 0.353 
CAPRATIO 353 0.135 0.132 0.030 0.113 0.156 
CGSCORE 353 60.128 69.430 26.315 36.560 82.410 
GROWTH 353 0.057 0.037 0.154 -0.031 0.107 
MTB 353 1.068 0.899 0.681 0.562 1.424 
EBP 353 -0.003 -0.001 0.013 -0.007 0.004 
LOSS 353 0.212 0.000 0.410 0.000 0.000 
LMVE 353 16.407 16.434 1.542 15.309 17.485 
TIER1 353 0.107 0.106 0.031 0.082 0.123 
PASTLLP 353 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.008 
REG 353 0.357 0.000 0.480 0.000 1.000 
 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 4. Pearson correlation matrix  
 
 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. 




UNEXPTOTFEE 0.084 -0.034 -0.007
UNEXPNASFEE 0.070 -0.010 0.035 0.384***
UNEXPAUDFEE 0.047 0.002 -0.068 0.867*** 0.158***
NASFEERATIO 0.055 -0.014 0.013 0.172*** 0.479*** -0.176***
CAPRATIO 0.071 -0.061 -0.005 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.031
CGSCORE -0.000 -0.034 -0.026 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.123** -0.001
GROWTH 0.054 -0.030 0.034 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.095* -0.200*** -0.047
MTB 0.059 -0.055 -0.049 0.000 -0.014 -0.000 0.029 0.003 -0.051 0.275***
EBP -0.062 -0.461*** -0.513*** -0.011 0.000 -0.008 0.003 0.065 0.054 0.293*** 0.480***
LOSS -0.091* 0.333*** 0.287*** 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.042 0.069 -0.043 -0.325*** -0.384*** -0.682***
LMVE 0.041 -0.210*** -0.131*** 0.039 -0.108** 0.038 -0.037 0.332*** 0.384*** 0.146*** 0.378*** 0.457*** -0.374***
TIER1 0.084 -0.086 0.037 -0.067 0.064 -0.025 -0.052 0.871*** 0.020 -0.194*** -0.041 0.064 0.038 0.291***
PASTLLP 0.153*** 0.372*** 0.418*** 0.072 -0.000 0.045 0.104** 0.057 -0.198*** -0.179*** -0.156*** -0.593*** 0.344*** -0.325*** 0.059
REG -0.017 0.114 -0.124 -0.000 -0.011 0.000 -0.078 0.082 0.115** 0.017 -0.064 -0.112** 0.250*** -0.126** 0.048 0.042
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Table 5. Relation between ALLP and fee measures 
PANEL A - Income-increasing (negative) ALLP 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Dependent variable NEGALLP NEGALLP NEGALLP NEGALLP 
INTERCEPT -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.689) (0.969) (0.754) (0.844) 
UNEXPTOTFEE (β1) -0.000    
 (0.888)    
UNEXPNASFEE (β1)  0.000   
  (0.162)   
UNEXPAUDFEE (β1)   0.000  
   (0.930)  
NASFEERATIO (β1)    0.001 
    (0.422) 
CAPRATIO 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.808) (0.936) (0.834) (0.906) 
CGSCORE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.756) (0.831) (0.817) (0.690) 
GROWTH 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.027) (0.025) 
MTB 0.001* 0.001** 0.001 0.001* 
 (0.067) (0.033) (0.101) (0.078) 
EBP -0.042 -0.054 -0.038 -0.047 
 (0.427) (0.353) (0.480) (0.392) 
LOSS 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001 
 (0.082) (0.195) (0.081) (0.167) 
LMVE 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.918) (0.775) (0.941) (0.642) 
TIER1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.416) (0.625) (0.452) (0.582) 
PASTLLP 0.106 0.107 0.103 0.108 
 (0.211) (0.195) (0.227) (0.191) 
REG -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.694) (0.546) (0.769) (0.957) 
UNEXPTOTFEE*REG (β12) -0.001*    
 (0.071)    
UNEXPNASFEE*REG (β12)  -0.001***   
  (0.000)   
UNEXPAUDFEE*REG (β12)   -0.001  
   (0.351)  
NASFEERATIO*REG (β12)    -0.003 
    (0.186) 
β1 + β12 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.037) (0.000) (0.316) (0.269) 
Observations 192 192 192 192 
R-squared  0.390 0.410 0.379 0.381 
F-Stat 3.74*** 3.67*** 3.22*** 3.37*** 





Table 5 (cont’d). Relation between ALLP and fee measures  
PANEL B - Income-decreasing (positive) ALLP 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Dependent variable POSALLP POSALLP POSALLP POSALLP 
INTERCEPT -0.006* -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* 
 (0.085) (0.058) (0.074) (0.072) 
UNEXPTOTFEE (β1) 0.000    
 (0.946)    
UNEXPNASFEE (β1)  0.000   
  (0.402)   
UNEXPAUDFEE (β1)   -0.000  
   (0.347)  
NASFEERATIO (β1)    0.001 
    (0.725) 
CAPRATIO 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.795) (0.782) (0.959) (0.993) 
CGSCORE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.194) (0.129) (0.252) (0.195) 
GROWTH 0.003** 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) 
MTB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.480) (0.800) (0.850) (0.699) 
EBP -0.104** -0.074** -0.073** -0.089** 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (0.028) 
LOSS -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.605) (0.729) (0.646) (0.603) 
LMVE 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 
 (0.100) (0.042) (0.034) (0.068) 
TIER1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.655) (0.350) (0.718) (0.478) 
PASTLLP 0.021 0.019 0.022 0.021 
 (0.781) (0.740) (0.709) (0.756) 
REG 0.001* 0.002** 0.001* 0.002* 
 (0.082) (0.045) (0.084) (0.065) 
UNEXPTOTFEE*REG (β12) -0.000    
 (0.594)    
UNEXPNASFEE*REG (β12)  -0.001**   
  (0.045)   
UNEXPAUDFEE*REG (β12)   0.000  
   (0.970)  
NASFEERATIO*REG (β12)    -0.001 
    (0.590) 
β1 + β12 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.557) (0.095) (0.454) (0.709) 
Observations 161 161 161 161 
R-squared  0.498 0.455 0.453 0.476 
F-Stat 9.29*** 8.97*** 9.00*** 9.54*** 




Table 5 (cont’d). Relation between ALLP and fee measures  
P-values (in parentheses below the coefficients) are calculated using robust standard errors. For clarity, the 
year-specific and country-specific intercepts are omitted. *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level or better.  
 
Regression models: 
Panel A: NEGALLPit = α + β1AUDCLIBONDit + β2CAPRATIOit+ β3CGSCOREit +β4GROWTHit + β5MTBit+  
β6EBPit + β7LOSSit + β8LMVEit +β9TIER1it +β10PASTLLPit + β11REGit +β12AUDCLIBOND*REGit + εit 
 
Panel B: POSALLPit = α + β1AUDCLIBONDit + β2CAPRATIOit+ β3CGSCOREit +β4GROWTHit + β5MTBit+ 
β6EBPit + β7LOSSit + β8LMVEit +β9TIER1it +β10PASTLLPit + β11REGit +β12AUDCLIBOND*REGit + εit 
 







Table 6. Relation between income-increasing (negative) ALLP and fee measures: the impact of the 
financial crisis 
Panel A – Period up to and including the financial crisis 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Dependent variable NEGALLP NEGALLP NEGALLP NEGALLP 
INTERCEPT 0.005* 0.006* 0.004 0.006* 
 (0.095) (0.061) (0.226) (0.060) 
UNEXPTOTFEE (β1) -0.000    
 (0.412)    
UNEXPNASFEE (β1)  0.000   
  (0.166)   
UNEXPAUDFEE (β1)   -0.000  
   (0.546)  
NASFEERATIO (β1)    0.000 
    (0.655) 
CAPRATIO 0.007 -0.001 0.011 0.004 
 (0.496) (0.908) (0.292) (0.740) 
CGSCORE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.471) (0.657) (0.686) (0.499) 
GROWTH 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.025) 
MTB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
 (0.314) (0.299) (0.510) (0.683) 
EBP -0.023 -0.029 -0.014 -0.012 
 (0.502) (0.419) (0.656) (0.709) 
LOSS 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 0.001* 
 (0.033) (0.106) (0.016) (0.090) 
LMVE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.141) (0.122) (0.297) (0.124) 
TIER1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 
 (0.138) (0.296) (0.080) (0.198) 
PASTLLP -0.017 -0.019 -0.016 -0.019 
 (0.797) (0.789) (0.807) (0.784) 
REG -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.030) (0.031) 
UNEXPTOTFEE*REG (β12) -0.001    
 (0.147)    
UNEXPNASFEE*REG (β12)  -0.000   
  (0.129)   
UNEXPAUDFEE*REG (β12)   -0.001  
   (0.118)  
NASFEERATIO*REG (β12)    0.000 
    (0.870) 
β1 + β12 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 
 (0.077) (0.167) (0.057) (0.761) 
Observations 102 102 102 102 
R-squared  0.511 0.483 0.520 0.451 
F-Stat 8.24*** 7.89*** 7.40*** 9.46*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 6. Relation between income-increasing (negative) ALLP and fee measures: the impact of the 
financial crisis 
Panel B – Period after the financial crisis 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Dependent variable NEGALLP NEGALLP NEGALLP NEGALLP 
INTERCEPT 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.973) (0.911) (0.895) (0.905) 
UNEXPTOTFEE (β1) 0.000    
 (0.921)    
UNEXPNASFEE (β1)  0.000   
  (0.602)   
UNEXPAUDFEE (β1)   0.000  
   (0.999)  
NASFEERATIO (β1)    0.001 
    (0.523) 
CAPRATIO 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.011 
 (0.789) (0.681) (0.795) (0.597) 
CGSCORE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.646) (0.611) (0.750) (0.597) 
GROWTH 0.005* 0.006** 0.005 0.006** 
 (0.100) (0.043) (0.120) (0.046) 
MTB 0.001 0.002* 0.002 0.002* 
 (0.140) (0.092) (0.114) (0.086) 
EBP -0.013 -0.010 -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.865) (0.897) (0.867) (0.873) 
LOSS 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.135) (0.156) (0.139) (0.154) 
LMVE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.802) (0.879) (0.7550) (0.824) 
TIER1 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.903) (0.901) (0.882) (0.904) 
PASTLLP 0.094 0.110 0.086 0.111 
 (0.482) (0.389) (0.506) (0.363) 
REG 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 
 (0.592) (0.699) (0.585) (0.326) 
UNEXPTOTFEE*REG (β12) 0.000    
 (0.822)    
UNEXPNASFEE*REG (β12)  -0.001   
  (0.157)   
UNEXPAUDFEE*REG (β12)   0.002  
   (0.186)  
NASFEERATIO*REG (β12)    -0.008 
    (0.263) 
β1 + β12 0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.772) (0.165) (0.128) (0.308) 
Observations 90 90 90 90 
R-squared  0.489 0.512 0.500 0.512 
F-Stat 2.06*** 2.28*** 2.18*** 2.29*** 
Year and country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6. Relation between income-increasing (negative) ALLP and fee measures: the impact of the 
financial crisis 
P-values (in parentheses below the coefficients) are calculated using robust standard errors. For clarity, the year-
specific intercepts are omitted. *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level or better. 
 
Regression model: 
NEGALLPit = α + β1AUDCLIBONDit + β2CAPRATIOit+ β3CGSCOREit +β4GROWTHit + β5MTBit+ β6EBPit + 
β7LOSSit + β8LMVEit +β9TIER1it +β10PASTLLPit + β11REGit +β12AUDCLIBOND*REGit + εit  
 





Table 7. Relation between ALLP and fee measures: alternative measure for unexpected fees 
PANEL A - Income-increasing (negative) ALLP 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Dependent variable NEGALLP NEGALLP NEGALLP NEGALLP 
INTERCEPT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.969) (0.970) (0.924) (0.885) 
UNEXPTOTFEE_3Q (β1) -0.000    
 (0.946)    
UNEXPNASFEE_3Q (β1)  -0.000   
  (0.646)   
UNEXPAUDFEE_3Q (β1)   -0.000  
   (0.987)  
NASFEERATIO_3Q (β1)    0.000 
    (0.694) 
CAPRATIO 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.981) (0.991) (0.999) (0.948) 
CGSCORE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.768) (0.753) (0.763) (0.684) 
GROWTH 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.037) (0.026) 
MTB 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 
 (0.110) (0.071) (0.100) (0.101) 
EBP -0.041 -0.044 -0.042 -0.044 
 (0.433) (0.423) (0.400) (0.424) 
LOSS 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.108) (0.102) (0.132) (0.151) 
LMVE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.800) (0.748) (0.762) (0.708) 
TIER1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.580) (0.601) (0.595) (0.590) 
PASTLLP 0.102 0.103 0.101 0.106 
 (0.231) (0.216) (0.236) (0.203) 
REG -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.689) (0.788) (0.663) (0.653) 
UNEXPTOTFEE_3Q*REG (β12) -0.000    
 (0.989)    
UNEXPNASFEE_3Q*REG (β12)  -0.002***   
  (0.006)   
UNEXPAUDFEE_3Q*REG (β12)   0.000  
   (0.768)  
NASFEERATIO_3Q*REG (β12)    -0.001 
    (0.487) 
β1 + β12 -0.001 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.959) (0.001) (0.716) (0.535) 
Observations 192 192 192 192 
R-squared  0.372 0.385 0.372 0.374 
F-Stat 2.95*** 3.15*** 3.00*** 3.24*** 





Table 7 (cont’d). Relation between ALLP and fee measures  
PANEL B - Income-decreasing (positive) ALLP 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Dependent variable POSALLP POSALLP POSALLP POSALLP 
INTERCEPT -0.005 -0.005* -0.005* -0.005 
 (0.135) (0.073) (0.084) (0.102) 
UNEXPTOTFEE_3Q (β1) 0.000    
 (0.410)    
UNEXPNASFEE_3Q (β1)  -0.000   
  (0.594)   
UNEXPAUDFEE_3Q (β1)   0.000  
   (0.422)  
NASFEERATIO_3Q (β1)    0.000 
    (0.556) 
CAPRATIO -0.000 0.003 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.981) (0.808) (0.422) (0.950) 
CGSCORE -0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.272) (0.136) (0.872) (0.352) 
GROWTH 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) 
MTB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.631) (0.690) (0.672) (0.636) 
EBP -0.086** -0.088** -0.087** -0.085** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.029) 
LOSS -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.640) (0.497) (0.609) (0.587) 
LMVE 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.204) (0.040) (0.120) (0.123) 
TIER1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.415) (0.778) (0.524) (0.425) 
PASTLLP 0.010 0.029 0.023 0.023 
 (0.838) (0.666) (0.726) (0.732) 
REG 0.001* 0.001 0.002* 0.001* 
 (0.095) (0.128) (0.071) (0.100) 
UNEXPTOTFEE_3Q*REG (β12) 0.000    
 (0.828)    
UNEXPNASFEE_3Q*REG (β12)  -0.000   
  (0.477)   
UNEXPAUDFEE_3Q*REG (β12)   -0.000  
   (0.549)  
NASFEERATIO_3Q*REG (β12)    0.000 
    (0.828) 
β1 + β12 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.351) (0.159) (0.975) (0.257) 
Observations 161 161 161 161 
R-squared  0.477 0.475 0.474 0.476 
F-Stat 8.00*** 9.08*** 9.09*** 10.13*** 




Table 7 (cont’d). Relation between ALLP and fee measures  
P-values (in parentheses below the coefficients) are calculated using robust standard errors. For clarity, the 
year-specific and country-specific intercepts are omitted. *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level or better.  
 
Regression model: 
NEGALLPit = α + β1AUDCLIBONDit + β2CAPRATIOit+ β3CGSCOREit +β4GROWTHit + β5MTBit+ β6EBPit 
+ β7LOSSit + β8LMVEit +β9TIER1it +β10PASTLLPit + β11REGit +β12AUDCLIBOND*REGit + εit 
 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
